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Abstract
We study the relationship between an economic production activity,
modeled by a minimum-eort coordination game, and asset markets in
which securities values correspond to outcomes in the activity. We ex-
plore both theoretically and experimentally how nal prices and asset
holdings in the market inuence and forecast outcomes in the coordina-
tion game. We vary the incentives from the market relative to payos
from the game, the number of players playing the game, and whether
traders payos are inuenced by outcomes in their own game or an-
other game. In our experiments, markets lead to signicantly lower
(and inecient) group outcomes across all treatments. Prices are in-
formative about group outcomes and the market helps avoid wasted
eort in which players make choices higher than the group minimum.
Keywords: Equilibrium Selection; Coordination Games; Experi-
mental Economics.
1 Introduction
Markets are central to economics. Markets aggregate widely dispersed in-
formation and direct resources to where they produce the greatest value
(Hayek 1945, Smith 1776). An important feature of most markets is their
relationship to some underlying economic activity. For example, the value
and eectiveness of insurance markets depends crucially on the behavior of
those purchasing contracts (Shavell 1979). The value and eectiveness of
\prediction markets" depends on their ability to forecast economic events
on which the value of assets is based (Wolfers & Zitzewitz 2004).
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1This paper explores the relationship between asset markets, in which the
value of traded assets depends on the realization of an economic outcome,
and the underlying activity that produces the outcome. We use a laboratory
experiment, where we can control important features of both the market and
the underlying activity.
The economic activity in our setting consists of a coordination game
with Pareto-ranked equilibria, in which the payo to each player is a func-
tion of her own choice and the minimum choice of all players (see Van
Huyck, Battalio & Beil (1990), Crawford (1995)). In these games, multiple
players choose among several ordered strategies, with pure-strategy equi-
libria consisting of outcomes in which all players select the same strategy.
Players all do better if they coordinate on the highest (most ecient) equi-
libria, but they also prefer to select lower choices if they believe others will
do so. Such games have been applied widely to model economic activity,
from the relationship between beliefs and output in macroeconomic models
(Cooper 1999), to public good provision (Hirshleifer (1983)), to rm pro-
duction (Camerer & Knez (1997), Brandts & Cooper (2006)).
Given the extent to which nancial markets are often linked to the above
kinds of economic activity, we study the relationship between economic per-
formance, measured by outcomes in the game, and a corresponding market
in which participants trade assets with value contingent upon the outcome
in the coordination game. More precisely, in each period of our experiment
participants play the coordination game and receive payos from the out-
come in the game. However, prior to playing the game, participants trade
in a market with Arrow-Debreu securities, each corresponding to one of the
possible outcomes (minima) in the game.
Our primary purpose is to explore the extent to which markets may
inuence outcomes in the underlying economic activity. Our experiment is
thus informative about the relationship between markets and such activity.
For instance, in previous experiments using similar games, pre-play com-
munication among players helps reassure them of their mutual intent to
pursue the ecient equilibrium and is thus eective for obtaining the ef-
cient outcome (Blume & Ortmann (2007), Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe &
Ross (1992)). Thus, the pre-play market might be one mechanism through
which players engage in such mutual reassurance and coordinate on the ef-
cient equilibrium (see also Van Huyck & Battalio (1993)). More generally,
perhaps asset markets can allow economic agents the opportunity to com-
municate their intent to pursue ecient outcomes, thus directing economic
activity towards eciency.
The strategic uncertainty in coordination games means that players of-
2ten mismatch their choices at least when playing initially. These out-of-
equilibrium outcomes imply wasted eort on the part of economic agents.
Therefore, another important possible benet of paring market trading with
the economic activity is that it might eliminate such wasted eort. That
is, even if the market has no positive eect on aggregate outcomes (higher
minima), it may improve eciency by coordinating agents' actions on a
particular equilibrium (i.e., resulting in fewer choices above the group min-
imum).
While communication through the market might allow groups to achieve
greater eciency, the market also creates incentives for traders / players to
decrease the group's output in the coordination game. Since group output
is determined by the lowest action by any group member, any single player
can lower the output statistic unilaterally (assuming it is not already at the
lowest possible value). Therefore, a market with suciently high payos
creates a possible incentive to engage in such opportunism, thereby harming
the underlying economic activity.
We explore the above relationships between markets and economic ac-
tivity by varying the incentives of the market relative to the game. When
market incentives are high, the possible inuence of opportunism is consid-
erable the eect of markets on economic behavior might simply result from
modied individual incentives. However, when market incentives are low
such a direct inuence is less likely, and any inuence of markets on eco-
nomic behavior is likely to result from inuences on beliefs, communicated
through prices.
As we describe above, our research contributes to understanding the re-
lationship between markets and underlying economic activity. This knowl-
edge is particularly valuable in light of the recent proliferation of information
markets, which often yield valuable predictions of future economic outcomes
(Forsythe, Palfrey & Plott (1982), Plott & Sunder (1988), Berg & Rietz
(2003), Wolfers & Zitzewitz (2004)). However, understanding whether such
markets can accurately forecast the outcome of strategic interactions among
many individuals as in much economic activity is an important question.
Moreover, the possible inuence of such markets on the underlying economic
activity is also an issue that merits attention.
In every period of our experiment subjects simultaneously trade shares
in four markets, each corresponding to one of the possible outcomes of the
subsequent coordination game. To explore dierent ways in which markets
and economic activity interact we vary several treatments in our experiment.
First, as we mention above we vary the incentives in the market relative to
the coordination game. We also vary the number of players in the coordi-
3nation game since this is perhaps the most important factor in determining
outcomes in the game (Van Huyck et al. (1990) and Weber (2006)). Finally,
we vary whether the coordination game is played absent any market (Con-
trol condition), is directly linked to the market (Insiders treatment), or is
indirectly linked to the market by having players in the game trading in
a market whose values are determined by another groups game (Outsiders
treatment).
In what follows, we rst present a model of the environment in which
players rst trade in a market and then play the coordination game. This
model motivates several hypotheses regarding the relationship between the
market and outcomes in the game. We demonstrate theoretically (Section 2)
that the market may inuence outcomes in the game. Our laboratory ex-
periments (Sections 3 and 4) reveal that the presence of markets signi-
cantly lowers the groups minimum eort (output), which is true across all
our treatments, even when the market incentives are very weak (Market-L
treatment) or when the outcome of the game is unrelated to market payos
(outsiders). However, the market predicts such behavior and, perhaps as a
result of such communication, there is generally less wasted eort or choices
above the group minimum. We discuss our results and compare them to
previous research in Section 5.
2 The Model
Players participate in a two-stage game consisting of an asset market fol-
lowed by a coordination game. The value of the securities traded in the
asset market depend upon the realization of the minimum eort chosen in
the coordination game for a particular group.
In order to understand predicted behavior in the rst stage asset mar-
ket we must rst examine the second stage coordination game. Players
participate in an N player minimum eort coordination game. All players
simultaneously select an eort level ei 2 f1;:::;Mg: Each player's payo
depends upon their eort level and the minimum eort level, emin chosen by
all players:
i(ei;emin) = a + bemin   cei (1)
where 0 < c < b. In this game, any selection of eort levels such that ei = ej
for all i and j is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium
with ei = M for all i is the high eort equilibrium and Pareto dominates
any lower eort equilibrium where ei = m with m < M for all i. Generally,
equilibria with higher eort Pareto dominate those that involve lower eort.
4While many equilibrium selection arguments would suggest that the high
eort outcome is the natural equilibrium choice in this setting, the low eort
outcome (ei = 1 for all i) has some intuitive appeal in terms of risk. The
payo from low eort is `secure'; someone who has chosen ei = 1 receives
a certain payo whereas selecting high eort involves lower payos when
other players select lower eorts. Since the secure payo from low eort is
greater than the payo when the player select high eort but other players
select low eort, if a player assigns enough probability to events such as
other players playing lower eort choices, then she will prefer to play lower
eort herself. This concept is formalized by saying that the low eort Nash
equilibrium is risk dominant (Harsanyi & Selten 1988).
This game was rst studied experimentally by Van Huyck et al. (1990).2
This paper along with a number of other studies (Knez & Camerer 1994)
revealed two main regularities. First, while the maximum eort choice is
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, it does not emerge as a focal point in the
data. Second, group size inuences the equilibrium selection. Small groups
(with 2-3 subjects) converge to much higher eort levels than large groups
(9-16 subjects). Our experiments examined two dierent group sizes: Small
groups with three subjects each and Large groups with six subjects each.
Prior to the coordination game all players participate in an asset market
where security values are based upon the minimum eort level chosen by
some group in the subsequent game. There are M state-contingent securities
traded with the following payos:
Xm =

 if emin = m
0 otherwise
(2)
where  > 0.
There is a considerable literature demonstrating that properly designed
markets can provide high-quality information regarding uncertain outcomes.
In particular, Arrow-Debreu style securities, like the ones used here can e-
ciently aggregate information. Using experimental markets, Plott & Sunder
(1988) show that markets can aggregate dispersed information. Prior to
trading, subjects were endowed with private noisy signals (e.g., \the state
is not X"). While no individual subject could determine the realized state
of the world, in aggregate the state was known with certainty. Plott and
Sunder show that prices in many of these markets converged to the rational
expectation equilibrium, reecting the fact that private information was ag-
gregated. Field studies of asset markets designed to predict uncertain events
2The original presentation of the game is due to Bryant (1983).
5also show that these types of markets provide accurate signals regarding fu-
ture outcomes. Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann & Wright (1992) study the Iowa
Political Stock Market, which allows participants to trade securities linked
to presidential election outcomes. Forsythe et al. show that the market
better predicted ex-post outcomes than professional opinion polls. Further
support to the performance of this market is provided by Berg & Rietz
(2003) who summarize a decade long evidence on its accuracy over short
and long horizons. The interested reader is referred to Wolfers & Zitzewitz
(2004), Sunder (1992), and Spann & Skiera (2003) which provide further
details on the study of information aggregation using markets.
2.1 Communication and Equilibrium Selection
One factor that may signicantly improve coordination on ecient outcomes
in games of strategic complementarities is communication. Pre-play costless
communication generally improves the frequency of ecient play even in
games with more than two players (Blume & Ortmann 2007, Cooper et al.
1992). Asset markets may serve as an eective pre-play communication
device. Van Huyck & Battalio (1993) found that the inclusion of a market
in which participants could trade a limited number of certicates which
entitled the holder to play in a subsequent coordination game always resulted
in successful coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium.3 In their
experiment, the winning bidders, and thus participants in the game, are
those who assign the highest value to the right to play. Therefore, subjects
may be signaling via the asset market an expectation of high eort which is in
turn observed. The asset markets we study here oer a similar opportunity
for participants. By buying assets that only payo in the highest eort
level, subjects can declare their intention to play high eort. Thus, our
initial conjecture is that Arrow-Debreu futures markets may result in similar
coordination improvements to those observed via pre-play communication
and `right to play' asset markets.
Hypothesis 1 (Pure Communication Eect) Communication through
an asset market will improve coordination for both group sizes.
On the other hand, the eect of pre-play communication can depend crit-
ically on the structure of the communication. For example, one way com-
munication is often less eective than two-way communication at inducing
3Crawford & Broseta (1998) propose a model of learning dynamics that explains the
result in median eort games.
6improved coordination (Cooper et al. 1992, Weber, Camerer, Rottenstre-
ich & Knez 2001). Likewise, the asset markets in these experiments are
substantially dierent than those studied by Van Huyck & Battalio (1993).
Both the incentives created by the assets and the communication opportu-
nities enabled by the assets may have a substantial impact on their ability
to coordinate player choices in the subsequent game.
2.2 Portfolio Incentives and Equilibrium Selection
We begin by examining the direct eect asset markets of this sort may
have on the choice of eort levels in the coordination game. In contrast
to the right to play asset market of Van Huyck & Battalio (1993), where
the result of the asset allocations are sunk at the time players make eort
choices, player actions in the asset market studied here can directly aect
the incentives to play various eort levels in the game. No matter what
concept of equilibrium is imposed on the asset markets, all players will end
with a particular position of assets from each market. Let xmi be player
i's units of asset Xm and xi = (x1i;x2i;:::;xMi) be player i's portfolio at
the end of trading. Since these assets payo based upon the outcome of the
game, the original payos from Equation 1 are modied to be:




where m = 1 if emin = m and 0 otherwise. We call this game the modied
minimum eort coordination game.
It is straightforward that all Nash equilibria of this game also involve
identical eort choices since the payos from the assets are only aected
by the minimum eort chosen. With this is mind, the following proposi-
tion characterizes the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the modied
minimum eort coordination game.
Proposition 1 The selection of identical eort levels ei = m for all i is a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if asset portfolios are such that
for all ` < m,





(m   `) (4)
for all i.
Proofs are provided in the Appendix.
7This proposition tell us that the asset market can alter the expected
outcomes of the game. In particular, the following observations arise directly
out of the proposition:
1. For all asset positions, the lowest eort choice, ei = 1, by all players
is a Nash equilibrium outcome.
2. In order for higher eort choices to be Nash equilibria, it must be that
asset positions of the players are not too diverse.
3. When comparing asset positions, it takes more diverse assets for lower
eort to be preferred to higher eort.
4. The asset portfolios that induce certain Nash equilibria depend upon
the relative payo of the asset market () to the coordination game
(b   c).
Thus, while we should expect the asset position of the players at the end
of trading to aect the subsequent choice of strategies in the game, the
strength of such an eect should depend upon the payos in the market
and coordination game. If  is large relative to (b   c) then even small
dierences across a single player's state-contingent holdings may eliminate
the high eort choices as an equilibrium. On the other had, if  is small
relative to b c, large (potentially infeasible) cross-asset holdings dierences
will be necessary to change the set of the equilibria from those of the original
game.4
In order to examine this potential eect, we systematically varied the
payos. In the Market H variant (b c)= = 2 and in the Market L variant,
(b   c)= = 40. Thus, the Market L treatment signicantly lowered the
relative payo of the market. In order to see the potential strength of this
treatment consider the dierences in asset holdings that would be necessary
to induce an individual to be unwilling to play the eort level ei = 4. In
the Market H treatment, the individual would have to hold greater than 2,
4, or 6, more units (than units of the X4 asset) of the X3, X2, or X1 assets
respectively. Whereas, in the Market L treatment, the required minimum
dierences are 40, 80, and 120.5 Since the set of Nash equilibria in the
4It should be noted, however, that even if the set of equilibria have not been changed
by asset market holdings the payos in the coordination game have changed and become
potentially asymmetric. Brandts & Cooper (2006) and Goeree & Holt (2005) study the
eect of changes in payos on equilibrium selection in coordination games.
5The payos for the Market L treatment were selected after completion of the Market
H treatment in such a way that, given the observed asset positions of players from the
8modied coordination game is always a subset of the set of Nash equilibria
of the original game, we are lead to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Portfolio Incentive Eect) The presence of an asset mar-
ket will lower coordination in the Market H treatment and will have little or
no eect in the Market L treatment for both group sizes.
While this hypothesis suggests coordination will be more dicult as a
result of the inclusion of an asset market, it is important to note that the
asset market as conducted does not preclude ecient outcomes. The total
endowment of each state-contingent asset is the same so a uniform portfolio
of the same unit holdings for each asset was always possible for every agent.6
2.3 Markets and Communication
We present here one possible model of equilibrium in the market. There
are many obvious shortcomings of the model we propose but we also believe
it adequately captures the essential elements of rational expectations and
strategic uncertainty that are important features of both the market and the
subsequent game. We begin by positing a simple model that is consistent
with the stylized details of strategic uncertainty in the coordination game.
Suppose that each player has some beliefs about the minimum eort that
will be chosen by the N 1 other players where mi indicates player i's belief
that the the minimum choice of the other players will be m. The typical
story of coordination failure due to strategic uncertainty in this game is that
each player recognizes that high eort is the Pareto dominant equilibrium,
but due their beliefs about the choices of others players nd it rational to
player ei < M. Specically, a player's expected utility from their eort level





Market H variant, under these new payos no eort choice would have been ruled out as
a potential equilibrium. Only two occasions (out of 828) were observed such that subjects
ended with asset positions that would have eliminated some eort level choices from the
set of Nash equilibria under the Market L payos.
6The asset market might oer an opportunity to oset some of the risk associated
with other players playing lower eort. However, in this setting hedging or insurance
opportunities are limited for two reasons. First, as agents attempt smooth allocations
across minimum eort levels, the asset allocations become inconsistent with Proposition 1.
Second, the cost of acquiring these assets in the market further limits hedging.
9If players maximize their expected utility with respect to these preferences,
then they may decide to play eort levels other than the Pareto dominant
equilibrium. Let  = (1;:::;N) be beliefs for each agent. Then we
say that e = (e
1;:::;e
N) is an equilibrium given beliefs  if e
i maximizes
Equation 5 for all i. Players maximizing with respect to these beliefs provide
an explanation for the two forms of ineciency in coordination games. First,
if beliefs regarding low eort minima of other players are suciently high,
a player will prefer to play low eort herself. Second, players' initial eort
choices may fail to be ex post best responses to the ex post choices of the
other agents resulting in wasted eort. Of course, via repeated interaction
players will rene their beliefs to be consistent the observed history of play
and we expect that players will converge to a particular Nash equilibrium.7
The market, like any communication device, may provide an opportunity
for players to rene their beliefs prior to playing the game. Let pm be the
market price for the asset Xm that pays  in the event that minimum eort
chosen is m. In order to properly dene a notion of a market equilibrium
we must have two features. First, agents' asset buying/selling choices must
be consistent with their expected eort choices and their beliefs about other
agents. Second, the actual eort choices must be the result of maximizing
behavior in the second-stage modied coordination game. The following
denition of a market equilibrium incorporates both of these features.
Denition 2 (x;p;e) is a rational expectations equilibrium if there exist




m=1 mii(ei;m;xi)   pmxmi for all i.
2. e is an equilibrium given beliefs .
This notion of a market equilibrium places few restrictions on the set of
beliefs that are allowed for players. Thus, there are likely to be many po-
tential rational expectations equilibria. As is typical in discussion of ratio-
nal expectations type equilibria, we allow for prices to reveal information
to the agents. In particular, we say that a rational expectations equilib-
rium is revealing if the beliefs which support the equilibrium are given by
mi = pm=
PM
`=1 p` for all i, or beliefs are simply given by the observed nor-
malized prices. Further, the equilibrium is said to be fully revealing if there
exists an eort level m such that pm =  so mi = 1 for all i. In the event
of a fully revealing equilibrium, all strategic uncertainty is resolved and the
7Crawford & Broseta (1998) propose a model that formally interacts learning dynamics
with strategic uncertainty.
10resulting eort choices must constitute Nash equilibria of the game. If mar-
kets are an eective communication tool they should admit fully revealing
rational expectations equilibria that result in high eort for the players. In
fact, we nd that any Nash equilibrium can be supported as a fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Given an eort level m, there exists a fully revealing ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium with p
m =  and p
` = 0 for all ` 6= m and
e
i = m for all i.
The intuition behind this result is obvious. Let e
i = m for all i and notice
that, given these prices, for all players mi = 1 . However, this means that
each player has identical preferences and the marginal benet of another unit
of xi` is  if ` = m and 0 otherwise. Thus, setting p` equal to  for ` = m
and 0 otherwise insures that each agent is indierent between more units of
each of the asset and the equivalent amount of cash. Given this indierence
between cash and assets, portfolios can be assigned in order to ensure that
e
i = m remains a Nash equilibrium (the conditions of Proposition 1 are
satised); the allocation xim = xi` for all ` and i will trivially satisfy this
condition given any equilibrium eort level.
Proposition 3 suggests that information revelation that results in ecient
outcomes is possible, which could be taken as further support for our original
Hypothesis 1. However, any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is also possible
under this proposition. Therefore, we need to investigate whether any of
these potential equilibria are more likely to be observed. The attainment of
a particular rational expectations equilibrium is fundamentally a dynamic
process where agents begin with diering beliefs and some how converge to
a consensus opinion regarding the minimum eort that will be observed.
If small perturbations in equilibrium beliefs result in dramatically dierent
equilibria then we would expect that these equilibria would be unlikely to
be observed. We say that a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium
(x;p;e) is stable if for all  > 0 and for all i if there exists an x0 such
that (x0;p;e) is a rational expectations equilibrium given beliefs mj = 1
if p
m =  and 0 otherwise and mi = 1  if p
m =  and =M  1 otherwise.
If even one agent assigns some small amount of strategic uncertainty of the
choices of other players, and this uncertainty induces either market or game
behavior that moves the group away from the particular game outcome,
then this equilibrium is extremely fragile. The following proposition shows
that only one of the fully revealing rational expectations equilibria identied
earlier is stable.
11Proposition 4 The unique stable fully revealing rational expectations equi-
libria is given by p
1 =  and p
m = 0 for all m 6= 1 and e
i = 1 for all
i.
In order to see why the lowest eort is stable consider a player who now
places some small probability on others choosing a higher minimum. While
the dierence between beliefs and prices might create opportunities for trade,
given the player's eort plan e
i = 1, the marginal value of any asset that pays
o in the event of higher eort is still 0 and so the agent's trading preferences
are unchanged and allocations can be adjusted slightly to insure that e
i = 1
remains maximal. To see why higher eort levels are unstable consider a
player who originally planned to play e
i = M but now assigns some small
probability to other players selecting a lower eort. The marginal value of
an increase in holdings of these lower eort assets is now given by  > 0
and the player's demand for these assets is unbounded given the price of 0.
Thus, the player will buy all feasible units of the assets X1;X2;:::;XM 1
which, assuming feasibility is not overly binding,8 will induce them to take
a dierent expected utility maximizing eort choice and the equilibrium is
unstable.
The previous result demonstrates how the strategic uncertainty inherent
in the coordination game may infect the market equilibrium. Players who
plan on playing high eort but have some uncertainty about the play of
others are easily encouraged by market prices to take lower actions whereas
players who plan on playing low eort and are similarly uncertain remain
unwilling to invest in higher eort assets. This hypothesis stands in direct
contrast to the earlier Hypothesis 1 which predicts more ecient coordi-
nation due to communication. Unlike the asset market of Van Huyck &
Battalio (1993) where players' buying decisions helped to resolve strategic
uncertainty by demonstrating that the set of game participants were those
that expected high eort, this asset market contains the opposite incentive.
It is easy for the low eort players to declare their intentions by buying the
low eort asset and easier still for the previously high eort players to follow
their signals.
Hypothesis 3 (Market Communication Eect) The process of com-
munication through asset market prices will lower coordination for both
group sizes and both market payo treatments.
8The experiments conducted allowed nearly unlimited short sales so feasibility con-
straints were rarely binding.
12If markets can serve to communicate the eventual minimum eort, we
would expect that market prices will accurately predict such eort choices.
Proposition 3 identies fully revealing rational expectations equilibria that
precisely predict the game outcome. Since the literature on information
aggregation suggests that markets can be very eective at revealing such
information, we hypothesize that the market will provide a reasonably good
predictor of actual outcomes in the game.9 However, there are at least two
reasons to expect the accuracy of prices in the Market H condition to be
greater than in the Market L. First, it is often argued that markets must be
nancially relevant in order to encourage active trading. We expect trading
activity to be lower under the Market L condition and thus the market
prices will not be as accurate at predicting subsequent behavior. Second,
given that asset holdings signicantly reduce the set of viable equilibria in
the Market H condition, it may be easier to anticipate the equilibria that
will be played in the Market H compared with Market L.
Hypothesis 4 (Market Price Accuracy Eect) Market prices will more
accurately forecast group outcomes in the Market H treatment than in the
Market L treatment.
In coordination games, there are typically two forms of ineciency that
arise: (1) players fail to coordinate on the high eort Nash equilibrium,
which Pareto dominates other lower eort Nash equilibria, and (2) players
fail to play a best response to the eort choices of the other players. We
term the second type of ineciency \wasted eort" since it involves players
selecting a higher eort level than the observed minimum which only serves
to increase the cost to that player. A perhaps hidden benet of the market is
that it might result in more coordinated eort choices (more players selecting
the minimum number chosen) so that the ineciency generated by playing
something other than the minimum eort might be mitigated.
Hypothesis 5 (Wasted Eort Eect) The presence of an asset market
will diminish wasted eort for both group sizes and both market payo treat-
ments.
Importantly, wasted eort can be diminished even if the markets have re-
sulted in lower eort outcomes due to either the market incentives or market
communication eects hypothesized above.
9We do not, however, compare our market outcome with other forecasts of eort so it
is impossible to say that markets are a better forecast device than other choices.
132.4 Outsiders and Equilibrium Selection
The number of traders was kept constant in the markets across the Small and
Large group treatments in order to control for liquidity and the possibility
that market size might aect the performance of the market. This required
that some traders in both treatments were Outsiders, or the liquidation value
of their assets depended upon another group's minimum eort choice. In
order to observe the pure eect of market participation on eort choice, we
allowed Outsiders to participate in the second-stage coordination game as
well. Since Proposition 1 only applies to Insiders where their eort choices
aects the liquidation value, the set of Nash equilibria for the Outsiders is
unaected by the presence of an asset market.
Hypothesis 6 (Outsiders Behavior Eect) The presence of a market
will not signicantly aect group outcomes for Outsiders.
One might expect, however, that Outsiders could still be aected by the
potential communication eects of the market; they observe market prices
and assume that those prices also provide information about the intended
play in their group. Given that other Outsiders are also participating in the
same market, it is possible that some communication may occur through
the market. There may also be an \observation eect" in the sense that,
if markets result in lower eort levels of the Insiders, then these low eort
choices may have a contagion eect of inducing lower eort choices even in
those not directly impacted by the asset values. In order to at least partially
control for this eect, the participants in the Control treatment were allowed
to observe the distribution of eort choices of another group.10 While obser-
vation in the Control treatment occurred with a lag, we would expect that
observation would be qualitatively similar to observation of another groups
behavior via a market. Thus, any additional changes in Outsider behavior
can be directly attributed to communication eects of the market.
3 Experiment Design
As discussed earlier, three distinct treatment conditions were examined in
order to analyze the interaction between markets and coordination in games
with multiple equilibria. The three variants were: Control where all subjects
10For example, the group most likely to be adversely aected by this eect, Small
groups, were allowed to observe the choice of a Large group in both the Control and
Market treatments.
14participated only in the coordination game, Market H and Market L where
all subjects participated in the coordination game preceded by an asset
market and the relative payo of the asset market was altered.
All sessions started with subjects being seated in front of computer ter-
minals and given a set of instructions, which were then read aloud by the
experimenter. Throughout the session, no communication between subjects
was permitted and all choices and information were transmitted via the
computer terminal.
At the beginning of the session, each subject was assigned to a group.
This assignment did not change throughout the experiment. Each session
consisted of two Small groups (with 3 subjects each), and two Large groups
(with 6 subjects each). A typical session divided subjects into groups as
follows: groups A and C were Small groups, and group B and D were Large
groups. Each session consisted of eight periods, all identical in structure. In
each period, every subject submitted a number, corresponding to her eort
choice. Eort choice took one of four values: ei = f1;2;3;4g. The payo
function was was the same as in Equation 1. The parameters used were
a = $1:20, b = $:40, and c = $:20. Thus, the payo for the Pareto dominant
equilibrium in the coordination game was $2.00 under all variants.
In the market variants, subjects rst traded in an asset market in which
securities' liquidating values depended upon the minimum eort game out-
come.11 In the Market H treatment,  = $:10 whereas in the Market L
treatment  = $:005 in order to reective the decreased market incentives.12
Prior to trading, subjects were assigned to markets such that the number of
traders per market was xed at nine. This was achieved by conducting two
parallel and separate markets each populated by one Small group and one
Large group. In one market, the value of the securities traded was deter-
mined by the minimum eort of a Small group, and in the second market,
the value of the securities was determined by the minimum eort of a Large
group. Market 1 included members from groups A and B, trading securities
linked to the minimum eort of group A, and Market 2 included members
from groups C and D, trading securities linked to the minimum eort of
group D. Each market contained both Insiders - subjects who traded on
11In two market treatment sessions, only six market periods were conducted due to time
considerations. In both cases, subjects still participated in eight game periods with their
initial endowment taken as their payo from the market.
12The parameter amounts were expressed to subjects in `experimental dollars' and the
appropriate exchange was selected so that, in both treatments, the liquidation values of
the assets were exactly 1 experimental dollar. This allowed prices to potentially directly
reveal probabilistic information in both Market treatments.
15outcomes that they could directly inuence - as well as Outsiders - subjects
who traded on an exogenous outcome; groups A and D were Insiders and
groups B and C were Outsiders. Trading was conducted over an electronic
double-auction market. The trading stage lasted about 6 minutes. During
that time subjects were free to submit limit orders, which were posted to
the limit order book, or to accept limit orders submitted by others.
At the beginning of each trading stage, subjects were endowed with units
of the dierent asset and with an interest-free loan of cash. The endowments
varied across subjects and across periods but the aggregate endowment at
the beginning of each trading period was equal across securities at 54 units
per market. In each period two subjects in each market had an endowment
of 24 units of a particular asset and none of the other assets; one subject
in each market had an endowment of six units of each asset. The choice
of asymmetric endowments (across subjects) is standard in these types of
asset markets and is designed to stimulate trading by providing rebalancing
motives to participants. Also, the aggregate endowment did not constrain
further trading; subjects could sell each asset short.13 At the end of the
trading stage, subjects participated in the coordination game. Then, sub-
jects' positions in the securities were liquidated according to the appropriate
group's minimum eort.
After choosing their own eort level, subjects observed the distribution
of eort choices but not the identity of the eort choices. In addition to
receiving information about their group's eort choices, each group also
observed the eort choice of one other group such that a Small group was
matched with a Large group. The feedback provided to subjects in all
variants of the experiment was the same. In the market variants, subjects
were informed of the minimum eort of their group as well as the other
group participating in their market.
The experiment consisted of 17 sessions conducted at the Smeal Col-
lege of Business, The Pennsylvania State University, between the October
2006 and October 2007. Normally, eighteen subjects participated in each
session.14 No subject appeared in more than one session. Subjects were
recruited from a distribution list comprised of primarily economics and busi-
ness undergraduate students. Participants received a show-up fee of $6 and
an additional performance based pay averaging $13.52 (ranging from $7.00
to $28.40) for a session lasting around 2 hours.
13A margin requirement was used to ensure that no subject's short sales exceeded the
amount of their cash loan.
14In a few sessions, due to a limited number of show-ups, only nine subjects participated.
All these sessions happened under the Market L treatment.
164 Results
4.1 Minimum Eort Choice
We begin by discussing the observed eort in the coordination game and
the role of the market in these results. To do that, we compare the average
minimum eort of groups in the Control treatment and the Market H and
Market L treatments. Figure 1 depicts the level of eort choice under these
treatments over the eight periods of the experiment while separating the
data into Small groups (Panel A) and Large groups (Panel B). First, we
nd that the results under the Control treatment are in line with those
reported by previous studies (e.g., Van Huyck et al. (1990)); Small groups
generally coordinate on high eort levels, close to 4, and there is little decline
over time. In contrast, Large groups nd it dicult to maintain high eort
coordination and experience a steady decline in minimum eort chosen,
hovering around eort levels of 2.
Compared with the Control treatment, minimum eort in the Market
treatments is substantially lower for both Large and Small groups. For
Small groups, the eort level falls from 3.66 in the Control treatment to
1.84 in the Market treatment (averaged across the Market H and Market
L treatments). For Large groups, average minimum eort falls from 2.44
to 1.10. Minimum eort is not only lower overall but also on a period by
period basis.
These results are not only economically but also statistically signicant.
Table 1 reports ordered probit regression results of groups' minimum eort
regressed on group size and main Market treatment. These regressions take
into account the ordinal nature of eort choices. The results suggest that
minimum eort is lower for Large groups (across both treatments) by at
least 0:9 units. The main Market treatment lowers eort level by at least
1:6 units (across both group sizes) compared with the Control treatment.
Nesting both variables (column 3) suggests that Large and Small groups are
aected almost identically by the presence of the market, as the interaction
term is small and not statistically dierent from zero.
Another result that emerges from Figure 1 and Table 1 is the comparison
between Market H and Market L treatments. Group minima in the Market L
treatment appears to be somewhat higher than in the Market H treatment.
At the same time, in both market treatments, group minima is lower than in
the Control treatment (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 1). Given that payos
from portfolio holdings in the Market L treatment are very low compared
to the payos from the coordination game, this result is surprising.
17Since eort choice appears to trend over periods and since the measure
used above may mask interesting dierence in distribution of eort levels, we
examine an additional measure: the median of groups' eort level over the
nal periods of the experiment. This measure captures the eort the group
spent \most of its time" in. Table 2 reports the distribution of median
eort levels, across groups, during the latter part of the session (period 4
through 8). We see that in the Control treatment, Large groups' eort level
is almost evenly distributed with half of the groups selecting low eort levels
(of 1 and 2) and the other half selecting high eort levels (of 3 and 4). The
distribution of eort shifts dramatically in the Market treatment; virtually
all Large groups move to the lowest eort level. Small groups' eort in the
Control treatment is high, with all groups selecting 3's and 4's. Once again,
in the Market treatment, the distribution of choices shifts toward lower level
eort.
These results suggest that the presence of an asset market in conjunction
with a coordination game results in selection of an equilibrium that is sub-
stantially less ecient. For all group sizes and periods, coordination appears
to be lower in the Market treatment compared with the Control treatment.
The eect is not only statistically but also economically signicant. This
allows us to reject Hypothesis 1, which suggested that the communication
aorded by the asset market would result in higher coordination. These
results stand in contrast with the ndings of Blume & Ortmann (2007),
Cooper et al. (1992) and Van Huyck & Battalio (1993), which show that
other forms of pre-play communication increased coordination.
To better understand what drives these results we next turn to study
the two asset market dimensions that can inuence behavior. First, we look
at the eect portfolio incentives have on subsequent play. In that part,
we focus on the ways in which the liquidating value of security holdings
inuence individual and collective eort choices. Second, we look at the role
prices play in aggregating and disseminating players' beliefs.
4.2 Portfolio Incentives
As we demonstrated in Section 2, players' asset positions can aect the set
of Nash equilibria in the coordination game. Before turning to see whether
portfolio incentives can account for the dierence between the results ob-
tained in the Control and the Market treatments, we ask whether individ-
uals' eort choices are aected by their portfolio holdings. Table 3 shows
the results obtained from a marginal probit regression of individuals' eort
choices and their end-of-period portfolio holdings of assets X1;X2;X3;X4.
18The results show how the probability of choosing a given eort level changes
with an increase in holdings of each of these securities. For example, column
1 of the table measure how the probability of a subject selecting eort level
1 is related to her security holdings.
We nd that subjects that choose eort level m held more m security
units and less non-m security units. For example, column 1 Table 3 suggests
that subjects who choose eort level of 1 where 1:4% more likely to do so with
every additional unit of asset X1 holding. In this case, increased holdings
of assets X2, X3, and X4 have a negative eect (although not statistically
signicant). Similar patterns emerge if we look at subjects who chose other
eort levels; all diagonal elements are positive, and statistically signicant,
while all o-diagonal elements are negative.15
Given that individuals' choices appear to be related to their portfolio
holdings, we turn to test the implications of Proposition 1 to determine the
set of Nash equilibria after trading in the market. To do that, we compute
for each group and period the set of equilibria that are incentive compatible
with subjects' security holdings and the modied payos of the game. Recall
that in the Control treatment, the set of equilibria is f1;2;3;4g. Table 4
presents the observed distribution of group minima sorted into the dierent
sets of equilibria. For example, the rst column, labeled \f1g" reports the
frequency of group minima when only eort level 1 satises Proposition
1. Likewise, the second column, labeled \f1,2g" refers to all instances in
which eort levels 1 and 2 satisfy this condition. Panel A reports the results
for Small groups while Panel B reports the results for Large groups. For
comparison, we include the distribution of minimum eort in the Control
treatment in the last column.
While the theory does not allow us to select among equilibria, it sug-
gests which equilibria will not be played. We nd that when all groups
are predicted to select eort level of 1 (the rst column), 82% of the small
groups and 98% of the Large groups do so. Likewise, only 22% of the Small
groups violate this condition when they are predicted to chose eort levels
of 1 or 2, and 33% of the Small groups violate this condition when they are
predicted to chose eort levels of 1, 2, or 3. While groups' behavior is not
entirely consistent with the incentives induced by security holdings, these
results suggest an important role for portfolio incentives.
However, we suggest that the presence of markets lowers eciency in
15These results are inconsistent with the idea that subjects would use the asset market
to hedge. If that was the case, we should have found the opposite pattern; diagonal
elements in Table 3 should have been negative.
19a way that cannot be explained by portfolio incentives. To see that, we
compare the distribution of group minima when portfolio incentives do not
eliminate any of the equilibria (column labeled \f1,2,3,4g") with the distri-
bution of group minima in the Control treatment. Comparing the two, we
nd that for both Small and Large groups, group minima are substantially
higher in the Control treatment. For example, 70% of the groups in the
Market treatment for which portfolio holdings did not eliminate any of the
equilibria selected minima of 1 compared with 33% in the Control treat-
ment. More formally, using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of
distribution functions, we reject the null that distributions of minima are
the same across the two sub-samples at the 1% level (separating observations
into Large and Small groups).
In summary, the results regarding the portfolio incentive eects provide
partial support for Hypothesis 2. We nd that individual and group eort
levels are inuenced by their portfolio holdings. At the same time, we nd
that portfolio holdings cannot alone account for the full set of ndings.
In particular, the results obtained from the Market L treatment stand in
contrast to the hypothesis.
4.3 Price Informativeness
If portfolio holdings alone do not fully account for the eect markets have
on play in the coordination game, we turn to study the role prices play.
First, we examine the informativeness of market prices about the subsequent
outcomes of the game and the ability of subjects to use these prices as a
coordination device. In what follows, we use the average price over the last
ve trades (in each period) as our measure of market prices; utilizing other
measures such as the median of the last trades, the average of all trades, or
the closing trading price yield similar results.16 We measure price errors as
the absolute dierence between the observed market price and the realized
payos. Since each period involved observed and realized prices in multiple
(four per group) markets, we take the average absolute error of those four
markets as our measure of market accuracy in a period.
Figure 2 depicts the average price error in the Market H and Market
L treatments for both Small and Large groups. We see that price errors
drop considerably in the course of the experiment. For example, markets
trading the outcomes of Small group eort start with an average price error
of .395 in period 1 and drop to an average error of .119 by period 8. While
16When less than ve trades are completed, we average all the trades conducted in that
market and period.
20the distribution of minimum eort in Small and Large groups was very
dierent, we nd that the level of price errors are very similar across the
two sets. This similarity is preserved across periods. Next, we observe that
price errors in the Market L treatment are somewhat higher than in the
Market H treatment { particularly for Small groups. These results provide
supports for Hypothesis 4.
Further evidence on the connection between prices and eort choices
can be obtained from Table 5. The table reports results obtained from
estimating a marginal probit regression of individual eort choice on the
closing prices of securities X1;X2;X3 and X4. In these regressions we control
for subjects' portfolio holdings of these securities. We do that to isolate the
eect prices have from the previously documented impact portfolio holdings
have (see Table 3).17 As we can see, low eort level (of 1) is more likely to
be undertaken when the price of security X1 is high and the price of security
X4 is low. Likewise, high eort level (of 4) is more likely to be undertaken
when the price of security X1 is low and the price of security 4 is high. This
suggest that subjects' eort choices are related to security prices prevailing
in the trading round.
Since prices appear to be informative about subsequent group play, it is
natural to ask whether subjects in the Market treatment are less likely to
mis-coordinate by choosing eort levels that are higher than the minimum
in their group. That is, conditional on minimum eort being less than 4,
subjects are better o choosing eort levels no higher than the minimum.
We denote that as \wasted eort" { the extent to which group members
select choices above the minima, and measure it by averaging the absolute
dierence between subjects' individual eort choice and the minimum the
group.
The mean wasted eort, conditional on minimum eort choice, is de-
picted in Figure 3.18 For all eort choices and groups sizes, wasted eort
is lower under the Market treatment compared with the Control treatment.
This is true for both Small and Large groups. Some of these dierences
are large in magnitude. For example, when group minimum eort is 2,
wasted eort is 40% lower in the market condition (across both group sizes)
compared with the Control treatment.
We test for the statistical signicance of these patterns in Table 6. The
dependent variable is group's average wasted eort. The rst regression
17Repeating the same set of regressions while excluding subjects' holdings yields very
similar results.
18Figure 3 deliberately omits group minimum eort of 4 since, by construction, the
wasted eort in that case is zero.
21reveals that the wasted eort is slightly higher in the Market treatment.
However, this result is largely due to the increased likelihood of the high
eort outcome; if minimum eort of 4 is chosen the deviation must be zero
by denition. When we control for the group minimum (columns 4 and 5),
we see that the wasted eort is signicantly lower in the Market treatment.
Not surprisingly, wasted eort is lower when group minima is higher and
when groups are Small. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 5, holding the
group outcome (minimum) constant, we nd that subjects are signicantly
better able to coordinate on that minimum in the Market treatment than
in the Control.
In summary, we nd strong support for Hypothesis 3. First, we show
that prices convey information. Second, we nd that this information aects
individual and group eort choices. Prices seem to play two roles. Prices
allow subjects to communicate doubt, which has negative eect on group
minima. At the same time, prices serve to coordinate beliefs thus resulting
in more frequent equilibria play and less eort waste.
4.4 Outsiders' Behavior
Recall that in the Market treatment each market is populated by one group
of Insiders and one group of Outsiders. Both groups proceeded to partici-
pate in the coordination game after trading in the market. However, only
Insiders' groups had their payos from the market related to their decisions
in subsequent coordination game. Therefore, if portfolio holdings are the
driving force behind the eect markets have on the behavior in the coor-
dination game, Outsiders should be unaected by the presence of markets
and therefore should select eort levels similar to those observed under the
Control treatment. Table 7 estimates the dierence in minimum group ef-
fort between the Insiders and Outsiders while controlling for group size and
market incentives. The results suggest that contrary to the hypothesis put
forth, Outsiders' groups do not appear to select dierent minimum eort
level than Insiders' groups. Interacting group size with Insider/Outsider
treatments does not yield statistically signicant dierences associated with
Outsiders. Crossing Market H/Market L and Insider/Outsider treatments
yields marginally signicant results for the interaction term (column 3) but
not for the main eect. Thus, Outsiders seems to be aected by the pres-
ence of the market { thus reducing their group eort minima { almost to
the same extent as Insiders.
These results, which stand in contrast to Hypothesis 6, are anomalous
if one holds the view that the presence of markets aects behavior through
22portfolio holdings. However, they can be rationalized if Outsiders use mar-
ket prices as a focal point for coordination or if Outsiders are unable to
verify that observed prices reect beliefs of Insiders and therefore should be
disregarded. One way or the other, these results suggest that the coordina-
tion in the presence of an asset market can give rise to a linkage of behavior
across strategically independent groups.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we explore the relationship between asset markets and un-
derlying economic activity modeled by a coordination game. We nd that
incentives and beliefs created by the market inuence aggregate behavior in
strong and potentially negative ways. We show that:
 The presence of markets can be sucient to induce low eort (Pareto
inferior) outcomes in the subsequent game. This is true even for groups
who would have coordinated if the market was not present and for
groups not directly inuenced by the market.
 Market trading prior to play of the game reduces \wasted eort" in
the form of choices above the group's minimum. Thus, even though
overall eciency is reduced by the inferior group outcomes, this is
somewhat mitigated by decrease in mismatched eort choices.
 Despite its negative eect on group eort choice, markets are accurate
in forecasting the uncertain outcome.
These results are relevant for domains in which underlying economic ac-
tivity and asset markets are linked. While markets have enticing information
aggregation and forecasting possibilities in regard to some economic activity,
it is important to recognize that in some settings the markets themselves
might inuence the eventual realization of the economic outcome and may
do so negatively.
Field studies of prediction markets for election outcomes, movie sales, or
the weather do not typically suer from this problem because each trader's
inuence on the nal outcome is non-existent or at least very small. We be-
lieve that applications within rms are more likely to exhibit features similar
in nature to the context in our experiment. There are likely to be relatively
few traders and those traders are likely to also have some inuence on the
eventual observation in question. Additionally, many macroeconomic mod-
els rely upon some relationship between expectations and productivity, as
23in our underlying game. Given markets' role in communicating and inu-
encing these expectations in our experiment, it is possible that real-world
markets may play an important role in contributing to shifts into inecient
equilibria.
It is also worth comparing our results to those of Van Huyck & Bat-
talio (1993), who nd that a pre-play asset market improves coordination.
We believe the key dierence between our experiment and theirs to be the
symmetry in our asset market that is not present in their study. In their
experiment, the market creates jointly-held positive expectations of group
outcomes by eliminating those players who do not hold such beliefs. There-
fore, the end result is the resolution of strategic uncertainty and mutual re-
assurance among those selected by the market to play the game (Crawford &
Broseta 1998). In our setting however, the market creates both positive and
negative signals to players, and in addition does not exclude players with
beliefs that correspond to the inecient outcome. Thus, our markets con-
vey strategic uncertainty to players and allow it to \snowball" into negative
expectations about the likely nal outcome.
The dierence between the two experiments also helps make an impor-
tant point about the general relationship between markets and coupled eco-
nomic activity. While Van Huyck & Battalio (1993) demonstrate that such
a relationship can enhance eciency, we demonstrate the opposite. There-
fore, these can be viewed as contrasting existence results about how markets
impact economic outcomes. Real economic contexts in which markets and
economic activity are coupled will often resemble one experiment more than
the other, and features of both our experiments may be present in many
situations outside the laboratory. Our results suggest that considering the
precise inuence of markets on economic behavior is of signicant impor-
tance.
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26A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: In order for ei = m for all i to be a Nash equilibrium
it must be that
i(m;m);xi)  i((`;e i = m);xi)
for all ` 6= m. Consider ` > m, then we have
i(m;e i = m);xi) = a + bm   cm + xmi
and
i((`;e i = m);xi) = a + bm   c` + xmi
and obviously i((m;e i = m);xi) > i((`;e i = m);xi) for all xi. Now
consider ` < m. Nash equilibrium requires that
i((m;e i = m);xi)  i((`;e i = m);xi)
a + bm   cm + xmi  a + b`   c` + x`i
bm   cm + xmi  b`   c` + x`i
x`i   xmi  bm   cm   b` + c`
(x`i   xmi)  (b   c)(m   `)







Table 1: Group Minimum Eort




Market H -2.235*** -2.796***
[0.470] [0.601]
Market L -1.050** -1.255**
[0.458] [0.615]




Market H x 0.174
Large Group [0.788]
Market L x -0.208
Large Group [0.877]
Period -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.019
[0.022] [0.019] [0.026] [0.024] [0.029]
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
R2 0.1679 0.0591 0.2701 0.2113 0.3251
This table presents ordered probit regression results of groups' minimum eort
(across periods) on the following independent variables. Market treatment (Con-
trol(Market) treatment observations are coded as 0(1)); Market H treatment
(Control(Market H) treatment observations are coded as 0(1)); Market L treat-
ment (Control(Market L) treatment observations are coded as 0(1)); group size
(Small(Large) groups observations are coded as 0(1)); interaction between Mar-
ket, Market H, Market L, and group size; period number. Outsider groups are not
included in the analysis. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered by
group. *** denotes p < 0:01, ** denotes p < 0:05, and * denotes p < 0:10.
28Table 2: Distribution of Group Minimum Eort
Panel A: Small Groups
Median Eort Control Market-All Market H Market L
4 0.750 0.100 0.000 0.250
3 0.250 0.200 0.167 0.250
2 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.250
1 0.000 0.600 0.833 0.250
Observations 8 10 6 4
Panel B: Large Groups
Median Eort Control Market-All Market H Market L
4 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.250 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.125 0.100 0.000 0.250
1 0.375 0.900 1.000 0.750
Observations 8 10 6 4
The table presents the distribution of groups' minimum eort choices. Each obser-
vation represents the median minimum-eort over the last 5 period of the session.
Panel A reports results for Small groups and Panel B reports results for Large
groups. Outsider groups are not included in the analysis.
29Table 3: Individual Portfolio Holdings and Eort Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Holdings Eort = 1 Eort =2 Eort = 3 Eort = 4
Security 1 0.014*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004**
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Security 2 -0.003 0.007*** -0.001 -0.004***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Security 3 0 -0.006*** 0.006*** -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001]
Security 4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004**
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 720 720 720 720
R2 0.0908 0.0977 0.1084 0.0339
This table reports marginal probit regression results of individual eort choice and
portfolio holdings of securities 1, 2, 3, and 4. In column (1) the dependent variable
is coded as 1 if the subject selected eort level of 1 (and 0 otherwise), in column (2)
the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the subject selected eort level of 2 (and 0
otherwise), in column (3) the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the subject selected
eort level of 3 (and 0 otherwise), and in column (4) the dependent variable is coded
as 1 if the subject selected eort level of 4 (and 0 otherwise). Outsider groups are
not included in the analysis. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered
by group. *** denotes p < 0:01, ** denotes p < 0:05, and * denotes p < 0:10.
30Table 4: Portfolio Holdings and Equilibrium Selection
Panel A: Small Groups
f1g f1,2g f1,2,3g f1,2,3,4g Overall Control
Min Eort = 4 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.13 0.72
Min Eort = 3 0.09 0.11 0.33 0.26 0.16 0.23
Min Eort = 2 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.26 0.14 0.03
Min Eort = 1 0.82 0.78 0.67 0.19 0.58 0.02
Observations 34 9 3 31 80 64
Panel B: Large Groups
f1g f1,2g f1,2,3g f1,2,3,4g Overall Control
Min Eort = 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23
Min Eort = 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.30
Min Eort = 2 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.10 0.14
Min Eort = 1 0.98 1.00 0.00 0.70 0.90 0.33
Observations 46 2 0 23 80 64
This table reports the distribution of groups' minimum eort choices sorted by
treatment (\All" denotes all Market treatment observations and \Control" denotes
Control treatment observations) and with the Market treatment into sub-groups
based on the set of equilibria that are consistent with subjects modied payos and
their collective portfolio holdings. Panel A reports results for Small groups and
Panel B reports results for Large groups. Outsider groups are not included in the
analysis.
31Table 5: Security Prices and Eort Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subject's Min Eort
Ave Closing Price Eort = 1 Eort =2 Eort = 3 Eort = 4
Security 1 0.759*** 0.123 -0.096 -0.656***
[0.257] [0.099] [0.118] [0.222]
Security 2 0.003 0.059 0.117 -0.121
[0.293] [0.150] [0.127] [0.228]
Security 3 0.205 0.014 -0.111 -0.098
[0.297] [0.161] [0.084] [0.246]
Security 4 -0.565*** 0.063 -0.004 0.445**
[0.204] [0.129] [0.122] [0.214]
Observations 363 363 363 363
R2 0.2134 0.1388 0.0947 0.2048
This table reports marginal probit regression results of individual eort choice and
the average closing price of securities 1, 2, 3, and 4. In column (1) the dependent
variable is coded as 1 if the subject selected eort level of 1 (and 0 otherwise), in
column (2) the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the subject selected eort level
of 2 (and 0 otherwise), in column (3) the dependent variable is coded as 1 if the
subject selected eort level of 3 (and 0 otherwise), and in column (4) the dependent
variable is coded as 1 if the subject selected eort level of 4 (and 0 otherwise). The
estimation also includes subjects' security holdings as independent variables; these
coecients were omitted from the table. Outsider groups are not included in the
analysis. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered by group. *** denotes
p < 0:01, ** denotes p < 0:05, and * denotes p < 0:10.
32Table 6: Wasted Eort
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Groups' Average Wasted Eort
Market 0.328*** -0.916*** -0.926***
Treatment [0.127] [0.176] [0.163]
Large 0.220* -0.095
Group [0.127] [0.111]
Group Min -0.265*** -0.612*** -0.636***
Eort [0.046] [0.183] [0.189]
Group Min x 0.469** 0.470**
Market Treatment [0.211] [0.209]
Period -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.050***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017]
Observations 288 288 288 288 288
R2 0.1146 0.0629 0.377 0.4764 0.4813
This table presents ordered probit regression results of groups' average wasted eort
(across periods) on the following independent variables. Wasted eort is dened as
the absolute dierence between subject's eort choice and the minimum eort in her
group during that period. Market treatment (Control(Market) treatment observa-
tions are coded as 0(1)); group size (Small(Large) groups observations are coded
as 0(1)); group minimum eort; interaction between Market and group minimum
eort; period number. Outsider groups are not included in the analysis. Standard
errors (reported in brackets) are clustered by group. *** denotes p < 0:01, **
denotes p < 0:05, and * denotes p < 0:10.
33Table 7: Group Minimum Eort { Insider and Outsider Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Group Min Eort
Insider 0.102 -0.211 0.736 0.174
[0.346] [0.478] [0.494] [0.337]








Period -0.037 -0.042 -0.043 -0.049
[0.027] [0.029] [0.030] [0.031]
Observations 320 320 320 320
R2 0.0035 0.0725 0.0645 0.0931
This table presents ordered probit regression results of groups' minimum eort
(across periods) on the following independent variables. Insider treatment (Out-
sider(Insider) treatment observations are coded as 0(1); Market H treatment (Con-
trol(Market H) treatment observations are coded as 0(1)); group size (Small(Large)
groups observations are coded as 0(1)); period number. Control treatment groups
are not included in the analysis. Standard errors (reported in brackets) are clustered
by group. *** denotes p < 0:01, ** denotes p < 0:05, and * denotes p < 0:10.
34C Figures
Figure 1: Group Minimum Eort by Period and Treatment
The gure depicts average minimum eort levels (across groups) for Small (Panel
A) and Large (Panel B) groups. The solid line corresponds to observation collected
in the Control treatment, the dotted line corresponds to observations collected in
the Market H treatment, and the dashed line corresponds to observations collected
in the Market L treatment.
35Figure 2: Average Absolute Error of Market Prices
The gure depicts the average price error across periods and treatment cells { mar-
ket incentives (High and Low) and groups size (Small and Large). For each period
and group, price error is computed as the sum of deviation across the four securi-
ties between the average of last traded prices and realized security value (which is
either 0 or 1). For example, consider the hypothetical case where closing prices for
securities 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 0:6, 0:2, 0:1, 0:1 (respectively) and imagine that group
minimum eort was 1. The price error, in this example, is 0:9 (= 0:4+0:3+0:1+0:1).
36Figure 3: Mean Wasted Eort
The gure depicts the average wasted eort across treatments (Control and Mar-
ket), group sizes (Small and Large) and groups' minimum eort levels. Wasted
eort is dened as the absolute dierence between subject's eort choice and the
minimum eort in her group during that period. Group minimum eort of 4 is
omitted since by denition wasted eort in that case is equal to zero.
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